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Introduction 
 
 It is a new world, but America should not fear it.  It is a new 
world, and we should help to shape it.  It is a new world that calls 
for a new American foreign policy – a policy based on constant 
decency in its values and an optimism in our historical vision. 
Jimmy Carter, May 22, 1977, Notre Dame University
1
 
  
 The above words by Jimmy Carter emphasised the importance of the United States 
shaping a new world.  It was a new world characterised by an increasing presence of 
Third World nations asserting their desire to be equal, and confirmed the limits of 
American power.  US defeat in the Vietnam War, coupled with international crises 
such as the oil crisis of the early 1970s and domestic crises such as Watergate, 
placed the United States at a crossroads.  The US public and their elected 
representatives had lost the confidence that defined them before the Vietnam War as 
the world’s leading power.  Carter was the first elected president since US defeat in 
Indochina and the responsibility, therefore, fell on him to regain his nation’s sense of 
identity in global affairs.  Carter based America’s new foreign policy on promoting 
human rights in the world. 
In Central America, the main endeavour of the new US foreign policy was to 
return the Canal Zone to Panama.  The resulting Panama Canal Treaties suggest that 
the Carter administration took the opportunity to shape a more equal isthmus that 
respected the sovereignty of Latin American nations.  Yet, paradoxically, there was 
another instance in Central America, in which the influence of the Vietnam War 
                                                          
1
 Jimmy Carter, ‘University of Notre Dame: Address at Commencement Exercises at the University, 
May 22, 1977’, in Jimmy Carter: 1977 (in two books), [Book 1], 957,  Washington: Office of the 
Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, 1977-
1978 (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Library 2005), 
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=ppotpus;idno=4732130.1977.001 (September 27, 
2011).   
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impeded the Carter administration from shaping this growing sense of equality.   The 
Nicaraguan revolution was a prime example in which the legacies of the Vietnam 
War restricted Carter’s aim to shape the changing world.  The Nicaraguan revolution 
saw the fall of the forty-three year old Somoza regime on July 19, 1979, by a 
coalition of forces led by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN or 
pejoratively known as the Sandinistas).  It is crucial to evaluate US policy towards 
Nicaragua, because the country’s leader, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, was an 
example of the US’s long support of repressive regimes that maintained order in 
regions of economic interest to the United States.   Taking into account he had 
already set in motion a return of the Canal Zone to Panama, an area annexed by the 
US in 1903 to strengthen American economic trade in the region, the Nicaraguan 
revolution represented an opportunity for Carter to shape a new and more respectful 
relationship with the Central American country.  It also provided the opportunity to 
reclaim the confidence lost from the defeat in Vietnam because the possibility was 
there for the US to create a new constructive relationship, based on diplomatic 
cooperation, with its southern neighbours.   
 This thesis argues, however, that the legacies of the Vietnam War, which 
will be elaborated on later in the chapter, caused the Carter administration not to 
recognise the opportunity that Nicaragua represented.  Anxious about US 
intervention in another country’s affairs, the Carter administration decided against 
active diplomatic engagement with the nations of Latin America to resolve the 
Nicaraguan crisis.  Accordingly, the Carter administration missed a golden 
opportunity to influence a transition of power in Nicaragua from Somoza to a 
democratic government.  Instead, the Carter administration pursued a policy of non-
intervention, despite encouragement from Latin American nations such as Venezuela 
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and Panama to be actively engaged in resolving the conflict.  This policy 
marginalised the US from its Latin American neighbours and allowed a greater 
Cuban influence in the Nicaraguan revolution, which provided the Sandinistas with 
the final push to overthrow Somoza and establish a strong left-wing element in 
Nicaragua’s new government.2    
                                                          
2
 Although the Vietnam War had many legacies, the umbrella term ‘Vietnam legacy’ is used in the 
thesis to describe the overall influences of the Vietnam War on the Carter administration’s foreign 
policy.  Like previous scholarship, this dissertation refers to specific traits of the Vietnam legacy, such 
as the ‘memory’ and ‘syndrome’ of the Vietnam War. The use of ‘syndrome’ refers to the fear held by 
US government officials or US citizens to intervene in foreign lands as an effective means of 
supporting United States interests in the world.   The use of ‘memory’ refers to US recollection of the 
Vietnam War and its negative consequences for the United States.  The ‘Vietnam syndrome’ is an 
important aspect of this thesis.  Not only did Carter see US intervention in Nicaragua as immoral and 
counterproductive to US-Latin American relations.  Due to the failure of military operations in the 
Vietnam War, Carter and some of his officials had developed anxieties about the use of military 
intervention in foreign affairs.  Sources in relation to the ‘Vietnam syndrome’ will be referenced later 
in the introduction because a lot of the sources mentioned in relation to the Vietnam legacy, also refer 
to the ‘Vietnam syndrome’.   The ‘memory’ of the Vietnam War will prove to be important in an 
implicit sense because high ranking officials in the Carter administration, such as Cyrus Vance and 
Jimmy Carter himself, would have originally supported intervention in Vietnam, but came to regret it, 
hence their anxiety to use intervention during the Carter administration.  Another important phrase on 
the legacy of the Vietnam War is ‘lessons’.   This reflects the opinions of not only Carter and Vance 
to US defeat in the Vietnam War, but also other high ranking officials like National Security Advisor 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, and what they felt were the key lessons to be learned from the defeat. In the 
case of Vance, for example, a key lesson learned was that the United States needed to limit its foreign 
intervention, while a key lesson for Brzezinski was that the US needed to maintain its military muscle 
to contain communism, while simultaneously acknowledging the growing sense of egalitarianism 
expressed by Third World nations.  In other words, the lessons from the Vietnam War will vary from 
person to person depending on their opinions, while a legacy can be seen through a collective anxiety 
expressed by a group, for example, such as Carter, Vance and other US officials wanting to limit 
foreign intervention, or the reaction of another group to that anxiety, such as Brzezinski and others 
within the US government emphasising that the United States needed to use its military muscle.  On 
the whole, the ‘lessons’ of Vietnam will come under the umbrella term ‘legacy’.  Important sources 
on the Vietnam memory are: Julia Bleakney, Revisiting Vietnam: memories, memorials, museums 
(New York: Routledge, 2006); Kenton J. Clymer, The Vietnam War: its history, literature and music 
(El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1998); John Carlos Rowe and Rick Berg, eds., The Vietnam War and 
American culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991);  Benjamin DeCarvalho, ‘War Hurts: 
Vietnam Movies and the Memory of a Lost War’, Millennium – Journal of International Studies, Vol. 
34, No. 3, (2006), 951 – 962; Katherine Kinney, Friendly fire: American images of the Vietnam War 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); P. Uchmanowicz, ‘Vanishing Vietnam: Whiteness and the 
Technology of Memory’, Literature and Psychology, Vol. 41, No. 4, (1995), 30-50; Keith Beattie, 
The Scar That Binds: American Culture and the Vietnam War (New York: New York University 
Press, 1998); Jerry Lembcke, The spitting image: myth, memory, and the legacy of Vietnam (New 
York: New York University Press, 1998); Marita Sturken, Tangled memories: the Vietnam War, the 
AIDS epidemic, and the politics of remembering (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); 
Patrick Hagopian, The Vietnam War in American Memory: Veterans, Memorials, and the Politics of 
Healing (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2009); Fred Turner, Echoes of combat: the 
Vietnam War in American memory (New York: Anchor Books, 1996); H n-ik Kw n, Ghosts of war 
in Vietnam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); David Ryan, US collective memory, 
intervention and Vietnam: the cultural politics of US foreign policy since 1969 (London: Routledge, 
forthcoming); Melani McAlister, ‘A Cultural History of the War without End’, The Journal of 
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 The introduction will first outline the three contexts fundamental to 
understanding US foreign policy post-World War II, and how these relate to the 
Carter administration and Nicaragua.  Secondly, the aims and objectives of the thesis 
will be established.   Thirdly, the methodology will follow, outlining the type of 
research and the archives and libraries used to write this thesis.  Fourthly, the 
literature review will analyse and evaluate the work already produced on US-
Nicaraguan relations during the Carter era and sources on the Nicaraguan revolution.  
The literature review will also analyse and evaluate research on the United States’ 
post-Vietnam foreign policy.  Taking into account that there is a large body of post-
Vietnam research, it will only be the literature that has directly influenced this thesis.  
By outlining the literature on US-Nicaraguan relations during the Carter era, the 
Nicaraguan revolution, and the selection of post-Vietnam literature that has 
influenced this work, the literature review will outline the gap in the research that is 
filled by the thesis.  Finally, the structure of the thesis will be outlined, mapping the 
different sections, the main argument in each chapter, and their collective meaning.  
The Carter administration and US Foreign Policy in Context 
  There are three contexts fundamental to understanding US foreign policy 
post-World War II: the Cold War; North-South relations; and US defeat in the 
Vietnam War.  After the Second World War, the United States was challenged by its 
newly expanded role in global affairs.  Although it tried to aid the rebuilding of 
Europe after the war, there was an ideological rift and nuclear stand-off with the 
Soviet Union that created a bipolar world.  The Cold War between the two 
superpowers meant that like the post-World War II administrations before it, the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
American History, Vol. 89, No. 2, History and September 11: A Special Issue (September, 2002), 
439-455. 
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Carter administration had to factor in the extent of a Soviet threat when forming its 
policy towards a particular country or region.  Like other post-World War II 
administrations, moreover, the Carter administration had to factor in that the world 
was not that simple.  There was a more complex North-South context that influenced 
US foreign policy, characterised by international organisations that emphasised the 
importance of multilateral diplomacy, such as the United Nations (UN), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO).  Decolonisation meant that there were more states and new issues were on 
the international agenda, such as the maintenance and promotion of basic human 
rights, over-population, under-development, disease, terrorism, sustainable growth 
and pollution.  The Carter administration had to negotiate both contexts in its foreign 
policy.  For example, although Carter saw human rights as the basis of his new style 
foreign policy, Iran was such an important ally in the ideological struggle with 
communism that its appalling human rights record was tolerated.  Furthermore, in 
regard to the persecution of Soviet dissidents like Anatoly Shcharansky and 
restrictions on Jewish emigration from the USSR, Carter had to tone down criticisms 
for the sake of maintaining progress in negotiations on national security aims such as 
the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II).
3
 
 In addition to balancing both the Cold War and North-South contexts, the 
Carter administration was the first elected government since US defeat in the 
Vietnam War.  It therefore had to factor in that the United States was in a period of 
transition, a post-Vietnam era where its status as the leading world power was in 
question at both home and abroad.  The Carter administration, as will be seen in the 
thesis, tried to create a new post-Vietnam foreign policy for the United States that 
                                                          
3
 Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, U.S. Foreign Policy since 1945 (London: Routledge, 2001), 3, 13-
14, http://www.questia.com/library/102241659/u-s-foreign-policy-since-1945 (August 2, 2012).   
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acknowledged the limits of American military power, but also tried to maintain 
democracy as the ideology that other nations should follow.  The contexts of the 
Cold War, North-South relations, and the legacy of the Vietnam War, combined to 
create a US foreign policy based on promoting human rights around the world, but 
which could also use force if there was a direct threat from the Soviet Union in the 
Third World.  The Carter administration had created a foreign policy that recognised 
the limits of US intervention as exemplified from the defeat in Vietnam.  It also 
realised, however, that there were relatively new states in the world that were still 
finding their way; new nations that could, from the perspective of the US 
government, be negatively influenced by communism and the Soviet Union.   
 In sum, the contexts of the Cold War, North-South relations, and the legacy 
of US defeat in the Vietnam War, are fundamental to understanding the Carter 
administration’s overall foreign policy.  This thesis concentrates on Carter’s policy 
towards Nicaragua and emphasises the context of the Vietnam War because these in 
conjunction have not been studied in detail.  However, as will be seen in the thesis, 
the contexts of the Cold War and North-South relations (through inter-American 
relations between the United States and the Western Hemisphere) are also 
paramount.  Furthermore, the contexts often combine, with the Vietnam legacy and 
North-South relations, for example, intertwining within the framework of human 
rights and its use as a US foreign policy during the Carter era.  
 Aims and Objectives 
Firstly, the thesis aims to show that the legacy of the Vietnam War was a 
fundamental influence on the Carter administration’s Nicaraguan policy before the 
fall of Somoza.  President Carter, his Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, and his 
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National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, had post-Vietnam perspectives on 
how the United States should pursue its foreign policy.  Their viewpoints influenced 
a policy of US non-intervention towards the Nicaraguan revolution.  The United 
States wanted to leave Somoza and his opponents to resolve their own problems.  
This policy accommodated Carter and Vance’s anxiety about overseas intervention 
after Vietnam, and the limits of American power.  It also factored in Brzezinski’s 
belief that the US should only intervene in regions at immediate threat from the 
Soviet Union.  Brzezinski’s National Security Advisor for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Robert A. Pastor, felt that Latin America as a whole was not in 
immediate threat from communism.   
The second aim of the thesis is to highlight that the legacy of the Vietnam 
War was still implicit in Carter’s policy after the fall of Somoza.  With a leftist 
element at the core of Nicaragua’s new government, the Carter administration felt 
there was an increased threat of Cuban and Soviet influence spreading across Central 
America.  The fear of falling dominoes made the Carter administration more active 
in the region, promoting a policy of economic diplomacy to aid Nicaragua’s new 
government and the reconstruction of the country.  Through this policy, the Carter 
administration felt they could prevent the region falling into the hands of 
communism.  Hence, the Vietnam legacy of the domino theory influenced Carter to 
become more active in the region.  Although this was a constructive response, not all 
segments of the US government were content with economic diplomacy.  A counter-
argument emerged, guided by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that called for 
economic assistance to be cut off to the Nicaraguan government, as it was feared that 
such aid would be diverted to further revolution in the region.  As will be seen, the 
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antagonism in the US government over these perspectives led to increasing turmoil 
in Nicaragua and jeopardised the country’s reconstruction.   
These aims are achieved through two objectives.  Firstly, it is important to 
realise how the Carter administration developed its policy towards Nicaragua.  This 
objective is fulfilled by analysing US government documentation from the Jimmy 
Carter Presidential Library and the National Security Archive.  Determining the 
extent to which there was cooperation or argument within the US Executive and 
Congress, by researching US congressional hearings, also leads to a greater 
understanding in this respect.  It reveals that the Carter administration had to balance 
competing viewpoints in the White House National Security Council and the 
Department of State.  It also had to factor in lobby groups in Congress that were 
either in favour or not in favour of supporting the Somoza led government and its 
successor.  Accordingly, the Carter government failed to commit to the one 
perspective that would have enabled it to establish a new foreign policy towards the 
region and improve its relations with the Western Hemisphere.   Openly criticising 
the Somoza regime’s human rights abuse and cutting off aid would have allowed the 
US government to maintain active involvement in the region.  The Carter 
administration’s commitment to non-intervention early in its term, however, meant 
that the United States became increasingly marginalised from the crisis.  The 
emphasis on non-intervention also stopped the Carter administration from creating 
strong diplomatic links with the opposition that ousted Somoza in July 1979.  This 
put Carter’s policy of economic diplomacy at a disadvantage because the 
groundwork had not been done earlier in the presidency.   
Secondly, with the US wanting to decrease its role in the Americas, it is 
fundamental to evaluate the Latin American reaction to this policy.  Through 
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documents in the Jimmy Carter Library and the National Security Archive, it is 
possible to show that countries like Venezuela, although supportive of Carter’s 
promotion of human rights, wanted the United States to openly oppose the Somoza 
regime.  The Venezuelan government made it quite clear to the US that they would 
actively aim to depose Somoza.  Despite growing intelligence that Venezuela and 
other countries, such as Costa Rica, Panama and Cuba, were helping the Sandinistas, 
the Carter administration decided to continue with non-intervention.  This left space 
for the Nicaraguan revolution to escalate.  When the Carter administration responded 
to the increased turmoil by promoting a mediation process between Somoza and his 
opponents, it was evident that the Carter administration lost its opportunity to 
influence a smooth resolution.  Venezuela by this time stopped seeking US 
involvement.   This marginalised the United States from a resolution because it 
depended on countries like Venezuela to negotiate on its behalf with the Sandinistas.  
With the US marginalised, this in turn allowed for an increased Cuban influence 
which consolidated the Sandinistas and helped them make the final push in May 
1979 to oust Somoza and the National Guard.  When Nicaragua’s new government 
took over in July, the Carter administration had to compete with a contrasting 
ideology in the region because it had decided not to cooperate with Latin American 
countries earlier in its term.  
Collectively, and ironically, the Carter administration and its insistence on 
non-intervention marginalised the US from Latin America.  It sent out a signal to 
democratic leaders in the Western Hemisphere that the United States was not willing 
to commit to its promotion of human rights in the Third World.  Carter’s government 
isolated itself from resolving the Nicaraguan crisis, despite increasing disaffection in 
the region against human rights abuses by the repressive dictator Somoza.  
10 
 
Methodology   
 The thesis is a history of American foreign policy and diplomatic relations on 
the Nicaraguan revolution.   The core is diplomatic history and document analysis of 
policy formation.  Through this method the thesis adds a detailed analysis of the 
Vietnam framework to contexts already established in research on US foreign policy 
towards Nicaragua.  The context of the Vietnam War and its legacy is added to the 
contexts of the Cold War and the inter-American relationship (or North-South 
relations), to produce a deeper understanding of Carter’s failure, in the case of 
Nicaragua, to lead and shape the country in its bid for a greater sense of equality.  
The three contexts will be given more attention in the Literature Review, while this 
section will outline the government and media sources that are fundamental to this 
work.   
The key component to the thesis is US governmental documentation from the 
Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, Georgia, and the National Security Archive, 
Washington, DC.   In relation to the Jimmy Carter Library, there has been significant 
declassification of new material, the most recent declassifications taking place in 
2008.   These documents provide greater insight into Carter’s Nicaraguan policy.  
The sources provide invaluable information on the high-level decision making on 
Nicaragua by key figures of the Carter administration, such as Secretary of State 
Cyrus Vance, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, and President Jimmy 
Carter himself.  At the core of these documents, furthermore, are the decisions and 
viewpoints of Carter, Vance and Brzezinski’s colleagues and advisors.  For example, 
figures such as Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, National Security 
Advisor for Latin America and the Caribbean Robert A. Pastor, and Venezuelan 
Ambassador and Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Viron 
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P. Vaky, prove to be key players in the US Executive’s policy towards Nicaragua.   
These documents particularly unveil that these cardinal figures had as much 
influence in guiding the US Nicaraguan policy as Carter, Vance or Brzezinski.   
The National Security Archive materials provide invaluable information on the 
communication between the US State Department and the US embassy in Managua, 
Nicaragua.  Significantly, the views of US Ambassador to Nicaragua Mauricio 
Solaún come to the fore, and his belief in pursuing a more active policy towards the 
Nicaraguan revolution through diplomatic negotiations with Somoza and the 
Nicaraguan opposition.  The National Security Archive documents also provide 
invaluable perspective into the progression of the revolution and the growing 
discontent in Nicaragua with the Somoza regime.  The combination of government 
documentation from the Jimmy Carter Library and the National Security Archive, 
hence, allows for an all round understanding of the US executive decision making 
process, at both the high and low levels.   
This material is supplemented with other archival documents and media 
sources to complete the overall understanding of the Vietnam legacy towards US-
Nicaraguan relations.   Valuable material is also included from collections by the 
State Department, the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs and the Office of Central 
American Affairs at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), 
College Park, Maryland.  Furthermore, an insight into congressional influence on the 
Carter administration’s Nicaraguan policy is not only achieved through the Jimmy 
Carter Library and National Security Archive material, but also through 
congressional hearings from the Law Library of Congress, Washington, DC.  
Documents in relation to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Human Rights and Genocide 
Treaties from New York University’s the Tamiment Library and Robert F. Wagner 
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Labor Archives, provide invaluable context into the formation of the Carter 
administration’s human rights policy and the wider context in which it was 
developed.   The Hoover Institution Archives in Stanford University, California, 
proved to be crucial for the personal papers of major Nicaraguan political figures 
like Alfonso Robelo, leader of the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN) and 
original member of the Junta Government of National Reconstruction that replaced 
the Somoza regime.  The United Nations Archive in New York, furthermore, was 
also important for Nicaraguan policy material, while the Columbus Memorial 
Library at the Organization of American States also provided some valuable material 
on inter-American relations in response to the Nicaraguan revolution.   
Media sources collected through New York University’s electronic resources 
database have helped to complete the picture, such as The New York Times, The 
Washington Post, the Christian Science Monitor, BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, and translations of Central American and South American broadcasts by 
the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS).  Research of English and Spanish 
language newspapers was completed in the New York Public Library; these included 
microfiche and electronic copies of articles from The New York Times, The 
Washington Post and El Nacional (Caracas, Venezuela).   Microfiche of Nicaraguan 
newspapers La Prensa, Barricada and El Nuevo diario have also been included from 
the Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane University, New Orleans.  
Collectively, the newly declassified government documents in conjunction with the 
additional archival material mentioned and media sources help to create a thorough 
picture of the Nicaraguan revolution and the US influence in Nicaragua’s political 
transition.  
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Literature Review 
The literature on the Carter administration and the Nicaraguan revolution can 
be divided into six categories.  Firstly, there is Jeane J. Kirkpatrick’s analysis of 
Carter’s Nicaraguan policy.  Secondly, there are books by academics, politicians, 
and former members of the Somoza regime opposed to US policy during the 
revolution and the government that replaced the Nicaraguan dictator.  Thirdly, media 
sourced and travel based studies were produced by journalists and academics on the 
Nicaraguan revolution.  Works by former Carter officials that evaluate the 
administration’s Nicaraguan policy make up the fourth category.  Fifthly, there is 
Morris H. Morley’s use of the state-regime distinction to analyse Carter’s policy 
towards Nicaragua.  The sixth category includes books that analyse Carter’s 
Nicaraguan policy and the aftermath of the Nicaraguan revolution, within the wider 
US foreign policy framework and other pertinent geopolitical contexts.  In addition 
to these six categories on US-Nicaraguan relations, a final category will be reviewed, 
made up of literature that evaluates US foreign policy after the Vietnam War.  As 
mentioned above, only the post-Vietnam literature that has influenced this thesis will 
be evaluated.      
Barring some of the works, these categories evolved chronologically and will 
be evaluated in that fashion.  By doing so, it is argued that this thesis fills a gap in 
not only the literature of US foreign policy and the Nicaraguan revolution.    It also 
makes a valuable contribution to the post-Vietnam literature on American foreign 
relations.   The thesis shows that there is not only a need for research on the legacy 
of the Vietnam War and US foreign policy towards prolonged conflicts like Iraq.  
The Nicaraguan revolution shows there is potential for future research on the legacy 
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of the Vietnam War, and its influence on American foreign policy in smaller Third 
World conflicts perceived to be of lesser significance to the United States.  
Kirkpatrick’s ‘Dictatorships & Double Standards’ 
The first important text on US foreign policy towards the Nicaraguan 
revolution came in the form of Jeane J. Kirkpatrick’s article ‘Dictatorships & Double 
Standards’, published in the November 1979 issue of Commentary magazine.  
Kirkpatrick argues that the Carter administration had influenced the overthrow of 
traditionally autocratic regimes in Iran and Nicaragua by demanding of them rapid 
democratisation.  The Carter administration in turn opened the door to anti-American 
groups, like the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, to establish new governments.  Kirkpatrick 
concludes that the United States should encourage the liberalisation and 
democratisation of autocratic governments, but only when they are not facing violent 
insurrection.  The United States, furthermore, should expect democratisation to be 
gradual, not immediate.
4
   
Kirkpatrick places her argument in the following framework.  That Carter has 
moved away from the long-established tradition of US governments tolerating 
authoritarian regimes in the Third World.  These regimes maintained order in the 
region even if that meant military repression against their opposition.  By moving 
                                                          
4
 Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, ‘Dictatorships & Double Standards’, Commentary, November 1979, 1-13, 
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/dictatorships-double-standards/ (December 6, 2011).  
Kirkpatrick published this article in her 1982 book of the same name.  See the following: Jeane J. 
Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1982).  In 1979 and early 1980, other material was released on the Nicaraguan 
revolution. In 1979 Pedro Camejo and Fred Murphy edited a short volume of speeches and interviews 
with Nicaraguan revolutionaries, which also contained a translation of the new Statute of Rights of 
Nicaraguans.  In early 1980 The Ecumenical Program for Interamerican Communication and Action 
(EPICA) published a book that aimed to systematise and present information about the Nicaraguan 
revolution and the new revolutionary system.  See the following: Pedro Camejo and Fred Murphy, 
eds., The Nicaraguan Revolution (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1979); EPIC Task Force, Nicaragua: 
A People’s Revolution (Washington, DC: The Ecumenical Program for Interamerican Communication 
and Action, 1980).   
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away from this established framework, the Carter administration failed to protect its 
authoritarian allies and exacerbated conflict in the Third World.  In the article 
Kirkpatrick is correct to note that the Carter administration began to distance itself 
from Somoza.  This was not an indication, however, of the US government not 
knowing its enemies.  Furthermore, it did not indicate that Carter assumed a 
democratic alternative was available to replace the Nicaraguan dictator, or that a 
Sandinista led government provided a better alternative to Somoza.  As will be seen 
in later chapters, Carter tried to accommodate Somoza to become more democratic.  
This was to no avail, however, as Somoza had no intention of negotiating with his 
opposition in Nicaragua.  If anything, the Carter administration early in its term 
failed to realise that Nicaragua’s opposition groups, which represented not only the 
radical Sandinistas, but also the working and business class of Nicaragua, presented 
an opportunity for the United States to improve its relationship with Latin America 
as a whole and move away from its historical link to autocratic regimes.  Not only 
were the Sandinistas supported by Panama and Cuba, they also had democratic 
support in the form of Venezuela and the majority of the Organization of American 
States.  The Carter administration marginalised itself from the increasing consensus 
in Latin America for increased democratisation.  Therefore, the United States, if 
anything did not make the assumption of there being a democratic alternative 
available.  Moreover, their distancing of Somoza was an attempt in 1979 to maintain 
the status quo the best they could, as the Carter administration wanted to preserve the 
US created Nicaraguan National Guard in any successor government.  Sustaining the 
National Guard, furthermore, was an attempt to decrease the left-wing element in a 
16 
 
new Nicaraguan government.   Therefore, an assumption was not made that a 
Sandinista led government would be a better alternative than the previous regime.
5
   
Kirkpatrick’s article received a lot of attention when it was published.  As 
William M. LeoGrande notes, the article was widely criticised at the time by 
academics as both historically inaccurate and logically unsound.
6
  Tom Farer, for 
example, notes that on the ‘most elementary’ facts in relation to Latin America, 
Kirkpatrick is ‘misinformed’.  For example, Kirkpatrick claims that the Carter 
administration disarmed Somoza and the National Guard.  The Guard, contrary to 
Kirkpatrick’s claim, was ‘bristled’ with weapons supplied by Argentina and Israel.  
Furthermore, despite almost half of the OAS members being recognisable 
democracies, Kirkpatrick has little to say about democracy in Latin America, except 
that she doubts its existence when leaders are elected in countries like Venezuela, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru and the Dominican Republic that ‘practice socialism, 
criticize the United States, and talk with Castro’.7  Others saw potential in 
Kirkpatrick’s analysis.  Richard V. Allen, Ronald Reagan’s top foreign policy 
advisor during his presidential campaign, recommended Kirkpatrick.  After several 
meetings between Kirkpatrick and Reagan, she was asked to join the campaign, and 
subsequently became ambassador to the United Nations during his presidency.
8
 
The different opinions on Kirkpatrick’s article can be further understood by 
her political background.  It shows that the article was politically biased against 
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Carter’s foreign policy and helps explain the observations of historical inaccuracy 
made by LeoGrande and Farer above.  Kirkpatrick was a university professor long 
active in the Democratic Party.  The Vietnam War, however, opened a great gap in 
the party between Cold War liberals and antiwar Democrats.  Kirkpatrick stood on 
the side of the Cold War liberals, and with her fellow conservatives founded the 
Coalition for Democratic Majority in 1972.  These Cold War liberals became known 
as neoconservatives.
9
  They applauded the Carter administration’s tough moral 
stances against the Soviet Union, but they complained when the administration took 
similar stances against authoritarian leaders in the Third World.  As they saw it, the 
Soviet Union was inherently evil and could not see the legitimacy of human rights.  
Authoritarian regimes in the Third World, however, simply departed from values 
held within their own system, and as a result were not a threat to US foreign 
interests.
10
     
 Despite the blemishes mentioned above, Kirkpatrick’s article is invaluable 
because it highlights the impact that the Vietnam War had on the Carter 
administration’s foreign policy.  She is aware of the transition period characterising 
American foreign relations.  A transition where the US needed to find its role and 
status in the world; that allowed it regain respect and power and maintain its strategic 
global interests.   Crucially, Kirkpatrick argues that Carter’s policy towards 
Nicaragua is a fundamental indication of US failure to effectively regain its strength 
as a global leader.  
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The Pro-Somoza Literature  
 Academics, politicians, and former members of the Somoza regime, 
followed Kirkpatrick’s article by producing books specifically on the Nicaraguan 
revolution and US foreign policy.  They were opposed to US policy during the 
revolution and the government that replaced the Nicaraguan dictator.  Like 
Kirkpatrick, these works were politically biased.  For example Western Goals, an 
advisory board made up of congressmen, military officials and academics, produced 
Ally Betrayed...: Nicaragua: keystone of Central America in 1980.   It condemned 
US policy towards Nicaragua and the background of several contributors, suggest 
that the work was setting forth a political agenda for a more aggressive policy 
towards Nicaragua, in order to counteract the possible spread of ‘communism’ 
through the Sandinistas.  Several of the contributors had experienced revolutionary 
upheaval against authoritarian regimes in Central America and the Caribbean.  The 
foreword was provided by Earl E.T. Smith, former US Ambassador to Cuba during 
the rise of Castro in 1959.  Turner B. Shelton provides a postscript.  During his US 
Ambassadorship to Nicaragua under the Nixon administration, the Sandinistas took 
hostage senior Somoza officials at a party in the Ambassador’s honour.   He had just 
left the party before the occurrence, but it nonetheless influenced his views on the 
Sandinistas as being trouble for the region.   Francisco Urcuyo Maliaño, acting 
Nicaraguan President after Somoza’s resignation, also provided a postscript to the 
book.  Maliaño
 
 wanted to hold on to power after Somoza’s resignation, but with no 
US backing, and the OAS wanting a transition to a new Junta Government of 
National Reconstruction, he was forced out of the leadership.
11
  The contributors of 
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the book, therefore, had the agenda of deposing the Sandinistas because they 
represented, in their view, the spread of communism in the Western Hemisphere.   
The book that deserves particular attention is Anastasio Somoza Debayle’s 
1980 memoir.  As expected, the former Nicaraguan dictator used his memoir to 
account his downfall and to attack his enemies.  In the memoir he mainly criticises 
the Carter administration for his overthrow.  The former dictator presents himself as 
being on a crusade to not only save the Nicaraguan people from the ravages of 
communism, but also to highlight to the US public their government’s aiding and 
abetting of the ‘evil forces’.  Somoza notes:  
When I, as President of a free and democratic nation closely allied with the 
United States, witness the betrayal and subsequent defeat of that nation, I 
firmly believe the citizens of the United States are entitled to know the details 
of that betrayal.
12
 
As the memoir persists, Somoza emphasises the communist ‘conspiracy’ that he felt 
the Nicaraguan revolution symbolised.  ‘Nicaragua was the first target in Central 
America’, says Somoza.  The country represented ‘the toughest nut to crack’.  
Somoza argues it was a step towards the Soviet Union’s capture of oil and gas 
reserves in Mexico, and that the spread of communism in Central America was a 
platform for this goal.  The former dictator goes on to tell the Carter administration: 
‘So get your map of Central America and color Nicaragua red.  Better make it blood 
red, too!’13  Somoza, in short, uses his memoir as a means of propaganda against the 
United States and his enemies.  The former Nicaraguan dictator overstates the Soviet 
influence and the possible communist conspiracy to spread revolution in the region.  
Somoza’s attacks on the Carter administration and the Sandinistas provide little 
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insight in to some of the key influences that caused Somoza’s downfall.   Such as the 
dictator’s marginalisation of the business class in Nicaragua after the 1972 
Managuan earthquake and the growing sense of egalitarianism, not communism, in 
the country.  Somoza fails to realise that he, as much as anyone, did not respond to 
the transitions taking place in the isthmus and as a result caused his own downfall.   
This failure can also be extended to Smith, Shelton and Maliaño.  They failed to 
understand that authoritarian regimes like that of Somoza and Batista represented an 
obstacle to equality in the Western Hemisphere, while simultaneously obstructing 
the United States from having a more positive constructive relationship with their 
southern neighbours.
14
   
Media and Travel Based Literature  
 Somoza was assassinated in Paraguay on September 17, 1980.  In its 
aftermath the next series of studies on the Nicaraguan revolution followed.  1981 
marked the start of media and travel sourced studies by journalists and academics on 
the Nicaraguan revolution.  Unlike Somoza’s self-justification and propaganda, these 
studies mainly concentrate on the significance of the Sandinistas’ success and the US 
failure to move away from repressive dictatorships.  Bernard Diederich’s Somoza 
and the Legacy of U.S. Involvement in Central America is the template for such 
research.  Not only does the book act as a biography to Somoza’s rule, tracking the 
dictator’s rise and fall, but Diederich documents the key events in the downfall of 
Somoza, while bringing to the fore the US tradition of supporting repressive 
dictators or regimes in Latin America and the Caribbean.  What is particularly 
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significant about Diederich’s book is that it allows space for the facts, well 
documented through his use of media sources, to recount the events of the 
revolution.  Through this method Diederich realises what Kirkpatrick, Somoza, 
Smith, Shelton and Maliaño fail to understand.  As Diederich argues in the preface: 
the collapse of the Somoza regime was ‘inevitable’ because the dictatorship, like 
Rafael Trujillo’s in the Dominican Republic, Fulgencio Batista’s in Cuba, and 
Marcos Pérez Jiménez’s in Venezuela, was just another line of ‘Latin strongmen 
who paid lip service to democracy and killed and tortured in its name to save the 
“free world” from communism’.15  His argument is given credence because as 
correspondent for Time magazine, Diederich covered Mexico, Central America and 
the Caribbean.   Diederich was on the ground not only for the fall of Somoza, but he 
experienced the repression of Francois Duvalier in Haiti.  While resident 
correspondent for The Associated Press, The New York Times, Time-Life News 
Service, and London’s Daily Telegraph, his reporting got him arrested, imprisoned 
and expelled from the country.   While exiled in the Dominican Republic, he 
experienced the assassination of the dictator Rafael Trujillo in 1961 and the civil war 
of 1965.
16
   Due to his experience, Diederich not only highlights the tyranny of 
Anastasio Somoza and his fellow dictators, he emphasises the paradoxical approach 
that one US administration after another took in promoting apparent freedom and 
democracy in the Western Hemisphere.   
 Diederich’s book represents a plethora of increased study on the Nicaraguan 
revolution after Somoza’s downfall and assassination.  Like Diederich, these works 
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recognise the paradoxical relationship that the United States had with dictators like 
Somoza.  Thomas W. Walker, John A. Booth and George Black all released books 
that were sympathetic to the revolution and critical of US policy.  Walker, Booth and 
Black argue that the US should have overthrown Somoza and might have, if the 
Carter administration had understood the situation better.
17
  Rachel M. McCleary, 
furthermore, builds on their work by exploring the ethical implications of US 
intervention during the height of the revolution in 1978 and 1979.  By tracking the 
key events of the revolution, McCleary shows that the Carter administration chose an 
approach in between their traditional policy of supporting dictators, and a newly 
transformed policy of deposing them.  The Carter administration chose to work with 
countries in the region to find a peaceful way of democratising Nicaragua.   
However, their commitment to such a policy, as will be seen in the thesis, can also 
be questioned.
18
   In addition, other works place the Nicaraguan revolution in its 
wider context.  Shirley Christian’s 1985 book Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family, 
for example, not only chronicles the events that led to revolt and the consolidation of 
the anti-Somoza opposition, but she also interviews Reagan era Nicaraguans, 
disillusioned with the Sandinista government, about their unrest in the early to mid-
1980s.
19
  Books and dissertations were also produced during this period on the need 
for the US to understand Central America, the Carter administration’s foreign aid 
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policy towards Nicaragua, and the Carter administration’s human rights and security 
policies during the revolution.
20
  Works were also published that explored the 
Sandinistas, their intellectual foundations and ideology, as a means of understanding 
their victory in the Nicaraguan revolution.
21
   
Literature by former Carter officials  
 The next phase of historiography that emerged includes books written by 
former Carter officials that evaluate the Carter administration’s Nicaraguan policy.  
They are significant because they take contrasting opinions on the success of 
Carter’s policy and also show the divisions in opinion that needed to be 
accommodated.  Robert A. Pastor’s 1987 work Condemned to Repetition was the 
significant turning point.  It filled a gap in the literature on the Carter administration 
because the earlier memoirs of higher ranked Carter officials, such as Jimmy 
Carter’s Keeping Faith (1982), Cyrus Vance’s Hard Choices (1983) and Zbigniew 
Brzezinski’s Power and Principle (1983) give little attention to the Nicaraguan 
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crisis.
22
  They had passed the responsibility of Nicaraguan policy to Pastor and other 
officials like Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Director of Policy 
Planning Anthony Lake.  Pastor’s viewpoint is of particular importance because he 
served on President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Council and later monitored 
Nicaraguan elections in 1990.  Pastor published a paperback version of the book, 
with a new epilogue, in 1988, and then again in 2002 entitled Not Condemned to 
Repetition.
23
   
In the first edition Pastor concludes that US policy towards Nicaragua was a 
tragic replay of the failed US policy towards Cuba’s revolution.  In both revolutions 
the moderate opposition, made up of the middle and business classes, were given 
support and advice by the United States, but they ignored it and supported their 
radical counterparts.  Both revolutions saw the US distance itself from the dictator 
and search for a middle ground to resolve the conflict.  In both revolutions 
democratic leaders in Costa Rica and Venezuela passed arms covertly to the rebels.  
‘The most fascinating and puzzling aspect of the Nicaraguan story’, notes Pastor, 
was that the key leaders in the US, Nicaragua, and their neighbouring countries, were 
all aware of the parallels with the Cuban revolution.  Yet, Pastor emphasises that 
neither the US, Venezuela, Costa Rica, the middle-class leadership in Nicaragua nor 
their enemy Somoza, could avoid repeating the mistakes of Cuba.
24
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The second edition, Not Condemned to Repetition, includes an explanation of 
how this tragic replay happened and the importance of engagement when dealing 
with the Sandinistas, such as the engagement that took place when free elections 
were finally held in 1990.   Pastor, for example, notes two moments during the 
Carter administration in which the US could have guided a resolution in Nicaragua.  
Firstly, in December 1978, Pastor notes that Somoza filed a request for exile, but the 
US ignored it and did not take the opportunity to influence a political transition.  
Secondly, from March to June 1979 the Carter administration moved away from 
active involvement in the Nicaraguan crisis after imposing sanctions on Somoza.  
Pastor notes this allowed space for the moderate opposition to move closer to the 
Sandinistas.  Pastor feels that this could have been avoided if the United States had 
been more active during this period.
25
  
 Pastor’s work is invaluable, but the potential was there to incorporate the 
Vietnam framework into the inter-American and Cold War contexts that he uses.  As 
will be seen in later chapters, Pastor was explicitly and implicitly influenced by 
Vance and Brzezinski’s post-Vietnam foreign policy perspectives.  Pastor was given 
the responsibility to create Carter’s Latin American policy in 1977.  In his formation 
of the policy he decided on a generalised approach towards the hemisphere, with the 
aim of factoring Latin America in to a global framework later in Carter’s presidency.    
The policy of non-intervention towards Nicaragua was chosen by Pastor to 
accommodate this transition and to factor in Brzezinski’s view to not intervene in 
any region perceived not to be at immediate threat from Soviet influence, and to 
factor in Vance’s view to limit US foreign intervention in overseas conflicts.  Pastor 
could have incorporated this framework into his memoirs, and as a result, it would be 
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transparent to see that the Carter administration needed to become more active a lot 
earlier then its mediation effort in October 1978.   
In addition to Pastor, further accounts from former Carter administration 
officials were published.  These included memoirs by Anthony Lake and former US 
Ambassadors to Nicaragua Mauricio Solaún and Lawrence Pezzullo.
26
  Lake in his 
memoir uses the fall of Somoza as a case study to show the workings of the US State 
Department in foreign policy making.  Lake’s memoir is invaluable because it 
highlights the extent to which the State Department and National Security Council 
placed the Nicaraguan crisis in their generalised policy of non-intervention and did 
not factor in changes that were needed, such as actively forcing Somoza to resign to 
ensure the smoothest resolution possible.
27
  Pezzullo and Solaún provide invaluable 
perspectives from the US embassy in Nicaragua that contrast Pastor’s justification of 
Carter’s policy.  Pezzullo recounts the final negotiations he participated in to replace 
Somoza with the Junta Government of National Reconstruction.  Pezzullo argues 
that before his arrival the Carter administration failed to distance itself from Somoza 
and marginalised itself from the Nicaraguan opposition and their Latin American 
allies.   The Carter administration failed to understand that they could not effectively 
resolve the Nicaraguan crisis as long as they were perceived to be linked to 
Somoza.
28
  Solaún emphasises that the Carter administration’s policy of ‘moral 
suasion’ and ‘minor economic sanctions’ towards Somoza, actually decreased the 
possibility of democratisation in Nicaragua because it allowed for the formation of a 
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broad based coalition.  Due to the US being uncomfortable with the new Nicaraguan 
leaders, the revolutionary government turned to ‘self-professed adversaries of the 
United States’, which in turn led to the decade of war under the Reagan 
administration.
29
  
Morris H. Morley and the State-Regime Distinction 
Morris H. Morley’s 1994 work Washington, Somoza and the Sandinistas 
represents the next progression in the historiography of US-Nicaraguan relations 
during the Carter years.
30
   Morley uses the analytical framework of the state-regime 
distinction to account for the Carter administration’s policy during the Nicaraguan 
revolution.  Morley’s framework is a crucial addition because it distinguishes 
Carter’s policy towards Somoza from that of the Nicaraguan state itself.   He argues 
that the Carter administration’s policy towards Somoza was mutable, but its policy 
towards the state was constant.  Morley points out that President Carter did not 
distance himself from Somoza because of his concern for human rights and liberal 
principles, but that he understood the US could only maintain its influence in 
Nicaragua by the survival of the state and not of any single regime.  In order to stop 
the prospect of a revolutionary government taking over in Nicaragua, Carter wanted 
Somoza to step aside in favour of a more moderate regime that would oblige US 
permanent interests and a more humanised National Guard that would defend them.  
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Somoza, however, refused to cooperate until it was too late, and the Sandinista 
dominated junta took power and the National Guard disintegrated.
31
    
Nicaragua in the Broader US and Geopolitical Contexts  
Literature was also published that encompassed the wider US foreign policy 
framework and other geopolitical contexts.  Further studies encompassing the Carter 
administration’s Nicaraguan policy as a prelude to the Reagan era were produced by 
Marc Levy, Holly Sklar, Cynthia J. Arnson, William M. LeoGrande and Timothy C. 
Brown.
32
  A series of studies were also produced placing the Carter and Reagan 
policies into the broader context of US-Latin American and US-Central American 
relations.  Walter LaFeber released his first edition of Inevitable Revolutions in 1983, 
placing the Nicaraguan revolution in the wider context of US-Central American 
relations, and the system of dependency created by the US government since the 
beginning of the twentieth century.  LaFeber updated the book in 1993 to include the 
Reagan and Bush years.
33
  Other key studies were produced by James Dunkerley, 
Lester D. Langley, Gaddis Smith, Peter H. Smith, Lars Schoultz, Greg Grandin, with 
Hal Brands producing the most recent contribution in 2010.
34
  John Dumbrell, 
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Gaddis Smith, Burton I. Kaufman, Scott Kaufman, William Stueck, Betty Glad, and 
Itai Nartzizenfield Sneh evaluate Carter’s Nicaraguan policy in the wider context of 
his overall presidency.
35
   Martha L. Cottam, moreover, studies the key perceptual 
groups within the US Executive and Congress during the Carter years to evaluate 
their effect on the Carter administration’s Nicaraguan policy.  Cottam argues that the 
perceptual group the Modified Cold Warriors, of which Carter was a member, 
dominated Nicaraguan policy throughout the administration in their search for new 
tactics to pursue containment.  The perceptual group that promoted a move away 
from the traditional foreign policy of containment, known as the Third 
World/Human Rights Group, of which Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) was a 
member, failed to come up with a comprehensive alternative to the United States’ 
traditional foreign policy.
36
  Tony Smith evaluates Carter’s Nicaraguan policy in the 
wider framework of US foreign relations in the twentieth century.  Smith argues that 
the administration’s policy of human rights in Nicaragua was far more realistic than 
Kirkpatrick’s emphasis on using force ‘to keep the dictator in power’.  Carter 
nevertheless, argues Smith, needed to act earlier and more directly with Latin 
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American nations like Venezuela, Panama and Costa Rica to insure ‘that democratic 
elections provided for a transition in power from Somoza’.37  Theda Skocpol, 
furthermore, evaluates the Nicaraguan revolution, along with others such as the 
revolution in Iran, to determine why revolutions take place in some countries and not 
others.  Skocpol shows that neopatrimonial dictatorships, like the Somoza regime, 
alienate the upper class and other social groups in their society, which in turn 
increases the prospect of overthrow.   A corporate military dictatorship like in El 
Salvador, on the other hand, does not alienate these groups and as a result is less 
likely to be overthrown.
38
  In addition, extensive research emerged concentrating on 
the legacy of the revolution from a Nicaraguan perspective, looking at topics such as 
the impact of the revolution on gender, religious faith, labour and agrarian reform, 
and the revolution’s effect on state, class and ethnicity in Nicaragua.39  Further books 
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on the legacy of the Nicaraguan revolution include the work on the Reagan 
administration and its funding of counter-revolution against the Sandinistas.
40
  On 
the whole, these studies of the Nicaraguan revolution compare and contrast the 
Carter administration within the wider US foreign policy or geopolitical contexts that 
shaped the conflict and its aftermath.  
The more recent works mentioned above by Hal Brands, Glad, Sneh, the 
Kaufman’s co-authored work as well as Scott Kaufman’s book on the Carter 
presidency, are of particular significance because they had the opportunity to avail of 
newly declassified documents in the Jimmy Carter Library.  Although this is the 
case, their study of the Nicaraguan revolution is constrained because they produced 
general histories, with the Kaufmans writing about Carter’s overall presidency, 
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Brands writing an overview of the Cold War in Latin America, and both Glad and 
Sneh writing about Carter’s overall foreign policy.  Taking this into account, this 
thesis takes the opportunity to evaluate in detail the newly declassified Carter 
material on Nicaragua.  Analysing this material builds on the invaluable work 
already produced on Carter’s Nicaraguan policy and the revolution.  This is because 
a lot of the works mentioned above could not avail of the new documents.  The 
works from Kirkpatrick to Morley could not source this material and their primary 
research was based on oral interviews and government documents that did not 
chronicle high-level decision making.   
The Post-Vietnam Literature and Its Influence on the Thesis 
The gap available in the literature allows for an application of the Vietnam 
legacy and its influence on US decision making towards the Nicaraguan revolution.  
It can be argued that the Carter administration had the opportunity to guide a smooth 
resolution and transition in Nicaragua, but failed to realise this because of their 
collective and individual anxieties over the Vietnam War.  This is an invaluable 
contribution because the previous scholarship mentioned above, evaluates US 
foreign policy towards Nicaragua through the contexts of inter-American relations 
and the Cold War.  The Cold War context, for example, is prevalent in Brands’ Latin 
America’s Cold War (2010) because it emphasises that the Nicaraguan revolution 
was one example of the series of volatile conflicts that characterised the Cold War in 
Latin America.  This contrasted US and Soviet experience, two countries that had no 
direct conflict with each other during the Cold War era.
41
  The inter-American 
context comes to the fore in the scholarship of LaFeber and Walker, because they 
argue that the Nicaraguan revolution was another example of the insurrection caused 
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by a US system that made Central America economically subservient to and 
dependent on its North American neighbour.
42
  Both contexts, furthermore, are 
prevalent in Pastor’s books, through their emphasis on the potential Cuban influence 
in the Nicaraguan revolution, and Carter’s Nicaraguan approach reflecting US policy 
towards the Cuban revolution.
43
   By no means does the Vietnam framework replace 
these contexts, but it is nevertheless a valuable addition that allows for a greater 
understanding of the anxieties influencing US decisions towards Nicaragua.  To date, 
brief sections in works by H.W. Brands, William M. LeoGrande and Cynthia J. 
Arnson are the closest studies done in this respect of US foreign policy towards the 
Nicaraguan revolution.
44
  It is important to note that the contexts intertwine, and 
therefore they should not necessarily be seen as competing ways in which to frame 
US-Nicaraguan relations.   
 Previous scholarship on the legacy of the Vietnam War has influenced the 
approach used in the thesis.  These studies have tended to concentrate on prolonged 
wars like the War in Iraq as a means of comparing and contrasting the policies 
pursued by the US in both respecting conflicts.
45
   There is a case, however, to 
suggest that studies should also be pursued on regional conflicts that were perceived 
to be of less significance.  This can indicate whether the Vietnam legacy influenced 
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or impeded the judgment of the US government in these regional conflicts.  A 
primary source based study on Nicaragua during its pivotal moment of transition is 
an important contribution in this regard.   It demonstrates the potential for further 
studies on the Vietnam legacy and its influence on US policy in such conflicts.   As 
Odd Arne Westad notes, the United States ‘created the Third World’ through its 
‘repeated interventions’, its ‘need for raw materials’ and through its ‘vision of 
development’.46  It is fundamental, therefore, for historians to understand fully the 
degree to which US governments would decide not to intervene in a particular 
situation, especially in a region like Central America, where the United States had 
developed amongst the indigenous population such a dependency on their North 
American neighbour.  Exploring the consequences of the Vietnam War, and its 
influence on the US government’s perception of their relationship with the isthmus, 
is crucial to understanding the Carter administration’s changing policy towards 
Nicaragua.   
 Scholarship on the Vietnam legacy by Charles E. Neu, Brian Balogh, George 
C. Herring, Arnold R. Isaacs, Robert D. Schulzinger, and James Peck have 
influenced the argument in this thesis that elements of the Carter administration 
feared reflecting on the military failures of the Vietnam War.
47
  Consequently, in the 
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case of Nicaraguan policy, the Carter administration did not consider legitimate 
means of intervention when the Nicaraguan crisis worsened.   
The scholarship of Herring, Marilyn B. Young, Lloyd C. Gardner and David 
Elliot has influenced the exploration within the thesis of the flawed executive 
decision making inherited from the Vietnam War.
48
  As a result, the thesis argues 
that the Carter administration failed to understand its enemies and allies in the 
Nicaraguan revolution.  Somoza was an example of the foreign policy Carter tried to 
change, and yet despite the growing opposition in Nicaragua to his rule, the Carter 
administration, although pursuing a policy of non-intervention and seeking to respect 
the sovereignty of Latin American nations, maintained military and economic 
assistance to the dictator on several occasions during the revolution.  
Simultaneously, the Carter administration turned down Venezuelan advances for an 
active diplomatic approach despite the increasing chaos in Nicaragua.  Its 
commitment to non-intervention meant that the Carter administration did not adapt 
its policy when needed to accommodate the fluctuating situation in Nicaragua.   
John Dumbrell and David Ryan’s study of the readjustments in the balance of 
power between the US President and Congress in the aftermath of the Vietnam War 
has influenced this thesis and its understanding of congressional influence on 
Carter’s Nicaraguan policy.49  Accordingly, this study emphasises that congressional 
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influence on Carter’s global foreign policy caused the US Executive to hold back on 
its commitment to resolving the Nicaraguan crisis.   
Herring, Michael W. Link and Betty Glad’s work on the Vietnam War’s 
deterioration of US self-confidence, has influenced the thesis to explore the extent to 
which Carter achieved a recapturing of this characteristic in its foreign policy.
50
  By 
exploring Carter’s policy in the final months of Somoza’s reign, it is possible to see 
that the Carter administration did not regain US self-belief because it was a shadow 
player in resolving the Nicaraguan crisis, having to fall in line and support 
resolutions guided by the countries of Latin America.   
The final major influence on the thesis is Matthew Masur’s work on the 
legacy of the domino theory in US foreign policy.  Masur argues that the Bush 
administration applied an altered version of the domino theory to the War in Iraq: a 
‘democratic domino’ that emphasised the spread of democracy as opposed to 
containing communism.
51
  In the case of Nicaragua, a modified domino approach, 
albeit different to Bush’s version, can also be applied to the Carter administration’s 
adaptation to the Junta government.  Fearful of the potential spread of revolution in 
Central America as a result of Somoza’s downfall, the Carter administration used a 
modified version of the domino theory in its justification to accommodate the new 
Nicaraguan government.   
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In sum, not only can the legacy of the Vietnam War be seen in the Carter 
administration’s emphasis on non-intervention and respect for the sovereignty of 
Latin American nations.  The influence of Vietnam can be seen in the traits that 
stemmed from these principles, which are: anxiety about the failures of intervention 
in Vietnam; flawed decision making process, characterised by an ignorance of both 
enemies and allies; readjustment of power between the US President and Congress; 
the negative effect of the Vietnam War on US self-confidence; and the ghost of the 
domino theory in subsequent US foreign policy.   
Structure  
  The thesis is developed in eight chapters and divided into three parts.  Part 
one, which consists of one chapter, provides a background to the Carter 
administration’s Nicaraguan policy.  It explores the three factors that are essential to 
understanding the Carter administration’s policy towards Nicaragua.  The three 
factors are: the unique relationship between the United States and Central America, 
the Vietnam War and its legacy, and the universal definition of human rights.  
Through this analysis, it is possible to see that the Carter administration needed to 
create a foreign policy towards Nicaragua that took into account the US system of 
dependency in Central America.  Anytime the US government decided to not 
intervene diplomatically or militarily in a Central American crisis, the turmoil 
became exacerbated and prolonged.  Carter’s policy also had to try and get over the 
anxiety felt towards military intervention after the Vietnam War.  It also had to avoid 
the inconsistencies of the Human Rights ideal.  If the Carter administration did not 
take these factors into account, then their policy towards Nicaragua would be 
ravaged with neglect, anxiety and inconsistency that would significantly decrease 
their ability to diplomatically intercede if need be.   
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Part two (chapters two to five) evaluates the Carter administration’s 
Nicaraguan policy until July 1979.  Chapter two explores the establishment of 
Carter’s human rights policy towards Latin America in 1977.  The chapter argues 
that the United States viewed Latin America in a generalised manner and did not 
create a policy specific to Nicaragua.   The United States, thus, underestimated the 
emerging crisis in Nicaragua.  Chapter three explores the aftermath of Pedro Joaquín 
Chamorro’s assassination on January 10, 1978.  US response to the assassination and 
the turmoil in its aftermath highlight that the Carter administration inherited the 
flawed decision making process of the Vietnam War.  Due to their blemished 
decisions, the Carter administration ended up marginalising itself from resolving the 
Nicaraguan crisis.  Chapter four evaluates the US response to the capturing of 
Nicaragua’s National Palace on August 22, 1978 by twenty-five Sandinistas, and the 
month of insurrection that followed in September.   The chapter argues that anxiety 
in the Carter executive about congressional influence on wider policy issues caused 
the US government to pursue the incorrect policy yet again towards the Nicaraguan 
crisis.  The National Palace take-over and its aftermath represented the moment 
when US congressional influence reached its potential on Carter’s Nicaraguan policy 
before the fall of Somoza.  Chapter five analyses the year 1979, up until to the fall of 
the Somoza regime on July 19.   The first half of 1979 not only represented the fall 
of Somoza and the rise of the Sandinistas, it also confirmed the failings of Carter’s 
policy towards Nicaragua.  The Carter administration had not reclaimed any 
confidence in US foreign policy decision making towards the isthmus.   Carter’s 
government had lost all belief in their ability to guide a resolution to the Nicaraguan 
crisis after their failed mediation attempt, and went back to a policy of non-
intervention.  In the shadow of US reversion, the countries of Latin America and the 
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Nicaraguan opposition were able to guide the resolution.  Although the Carter 
administration made a last-ditch attempt in June and July 1979 to maintain a 
National Guard influence in the successor government to Somoza, they had given the 
countries of Latin America the advantage in guiding a resolution by reverting back to 
a policy of non-intervention at the beginning of 1979.  On the whole, these chapters 
represent the first period of Carter’s Nicaraguan policy; a period in which the 
Vietnam legacy was highly influential in US executive decisions towards Nicaragua.   
 Part three (chapters six to eight) evaluates the Carter administration’s policy 
towards Nicaragua’s new government.  In chapter six it is argued that the Carter 
administration altered its policy to Nicaragua in conjunction to the new multifaceted 
government running the country.  To counteract a potential growing Cuban influence 
in the region, the Carter administration effectively moved away from their policy 
based on non-intervention and human rights.  Instead they emphasised constructive 
diplomatic relations with the new government to achieve economic development in 
Nicaragua through mainly private sector growth.  The ghosts of the domino theory 
and Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress were implicit in the policy.  The domino theory 
is apparent because the main influence on Carter’s new policy was the fear of 
revolution spreading to the Northern Tier countries in Central America and that 
Cuban/Soviet influence would implant itself in the isthmus.  The Alliance for 
Progress is apparent because the key component to the Carter administration’s new 
policy was economic development.  Chapter seven argues that this new policy was 
jeopardised because a CIA guided counter-argument arose at the beginning of 1980 
opposed to the Carter administration’s emphasis on economic assistance.   This in 
turn halted aid to Nicaragua.  Consequently, increased disillusionment occurred in 
Nicaragua and the foundation for increased tension between the Sandinistas and the 
40 
 
business class was laid.  This saw the resignation of two key Junta members, 
Alfonso Robelo and Violeta Chamorro.  Chapter eight argues that the antagonism 
between the Carter executive and the CIA made the Nicaraguan government more 
vulnerable, increasingly paranoid, and placed it in a weakened position for Ronald 
Reagan to capitalise on when he took over the US presidency.  On the whole, section 
three argues that the Carter administration tried to pursue a constructive policy 
towards the new Nicaraguan government, which they should be given credit for.  
The CIA, however, hindered the prospects of the policy and the Nicaraguan 
government’s opportunity to succeed.   
 Collectively, these chapters create an understanding of the Carter 
administration’s policy towards Nicaragua that has not been conducted before.  The 
thesis establishes that the Vietnam legacy played a key role in the Carter 
administration’s Nicaraguan policy.  Before the fall of the Somoza regime, the 
legacy of the Vietnam War was paramount and stopped the United States from 
playing an increased role in the transitional process.  In dealing with Nicaragua’s 
new government, its influence was implicit in the Carter administration’s policy of 
economic diplomacy.   
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